

## REMARKS

Applicants respectfully request reconsideration of the present application in view of the foregoing amendments and in view of the reasons that follow.

Claims 1 and 4-31 were pending. Claim 1 has been amended. Claims 1 and 4-31 are presented for reconsideration.

Claims 1 and 4-31 are rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-28 of Eastman et al. (USP 6,705,675) in view of Kain (USP 4,754,999). Claims 1 and 4-31 are rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-28 of Eastman et al. (USP 6,705,675) in view of Meeker et al. (USP 5,458,398). Claims 1 and 4-31 are rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-28 of Eastman et al. (USP 6,705,675) in view of Kain (USP 6,428,099). Applicants have attached hereto a terminal disclaimer to overcome these rejections.

Claims 1, 19-20, and 25 are rejected under 35 USC §102(b) as anticipated by Branke et al. (USP 6,227,616). Examiner White indicated in a telephone message to the undersigned that he considers mat 29 of Branke et al. to be the “first base” of claim 1 and ramp 15 of Branke et al. to be the “second base” of claim 1. Applicants traverse this rejection for at least the following reason.

Claim 1 defines a child seat that includes “a seat adjusting mechanism that connects the first base and the second base and that allows the second base to be adjusted *linearly* and in a plane parallel to a bottom surface of the seat body between a retracted, in-use position and an extended, in-use position relative to the first base to shorten or lengthen, respectively, the seating surface.” By comparison, in Branke et al., ramp 15 must be pivoted upward around hoop 13 to adjust the seat length. Once the desired seat length is reached, ramp 15 is pivoted downward again. See Branke et al., col. 5, line 52 – col. 6, line 5. Thus, Branke et al. does not teach or suggest “a seat adjusting mechanism . . . that allows the second base to be

adjusted *linearly* . . . relative to the first base.” For at least this reason, Applicants traverse this rejection of claim 1, and its dependent claims 19-20 and 25, under 35 USC §102(b).

Claims 1, 19-20, and 25 are rejected under 35 USC §102(b) as anticipated by Kassai et al. (USP 6,481,794). Examiner White indicated in a telephone message to the undersigned that he considers seat portion 8 of Kassai et al. to be the “first base” of claim 1 and plate 406 of Kassai et al. to be the “second base” of claim 1. Applicants traverse this rejection for at least the following reason.

Claim 1 defines a child seat “wherein a front wall of the seat body is positioned farther from the seat back in the extended, in-use position than in the retracted, in-use position.” By comparison, in Kassai et al., the front wall of the seat portion 8 remains the same distance from the seat back regardless of the position of the plate 406, that is, regardless of whether the plate 406 is in an extended position or in a retracted position. For at least this reason, Applicants traverse this rejection of claim 1, and its dependent claims 19-20 and 25, under 35 USC §102(b).

Claims 7-13 are rejected under 35 USC §103(a) as unpatentable over Kassai et al. in view of Carnahan (USP 6,474,735). Claims 7-13 ultimately depend from claim 1. Claim 1 is patentable over Kassai et al. for at least the reason stated above; hence, claims 7-13 are patentable over Kassai et al. for at least the same reason. Carnahan does not cure the deficiency of Kassai et al. For example, Carnahan does not teach or suggest a child seat “wherein a front wall of the seat body is positioned farther from the seat back in the extended, in-use position than in the retracted, in-use position.” Accordingly, Applicants traverse the rejection of claims 7-13 under 35 USC §103(a).

Claim 14 is rejected under 35 USC §103(a) as unpatentable over Kassai et al. in view of Carnahan and further in view of Lemmeyer et al. (USP 6,478,372). Claim 14 ultimately depends from claim 1. Claim 1 is patentable over Kassai et al. for at least the reason stated above; hence, claim 14 is patentable over Kassai et al. for at least the same reason. Lemmeyer et al. does not cure the deficiency of Kassai et al. For example, Lemmeyer et al. does not teach or suggest a child seat “wherein a front wall of the seat body is positioned

farther from the seat back in the extended, in-use position than in the retracted, in-use position.” Accordingly, Applicants traverse the rejection of claim 14 under 35 USC §103(a).

Claims 26-27 are rejected under 35 USC §103(a) as unpatentable over Kassai et al. in view of Laauser (DE 33 00 506 A1). Claims 26-27 depend from claim 1. Claim 1 is patentable over Kassai et al. for at least the reason stated above; hence, claims 26-27 are patentable over Kassai et al. for at least the same reason. Laauser does not cure the deficiency of Kassai et al. For example, Laauser does not teach or suggest a child seat “wherein a front wall of the seat body is positioned farther from the seat back in the extended, in-use position than in the retracted, in-use position.” Accordingly, Applicants traverse the rejection of claims 26-27 under 35 USC §103(a).

Claim 27 is rejected under 35 USC §103(a) as unpatentable of Kassai et al. in view of Russo et al. (USP 4,693,515). Claim 27 depends from claim 1. Claim 27 is patentable over Kassai et al. for at least the reason stated above; hence, claim 27 is patentable over Kassai et al. for at least the same reason. Russo et al. does not cure the deficiency of Kassai et al. For example, Russo et al. does not teach or suggest a child seat “wherein a front wall of the seat body is positioned farther from the seat back in the extended, in-use position than in the retracted, in-use position.” Accordingly, Applicants traverse the rejection of claim 27 under 35 USC §103(a).

Applicants believe that the present application is now in condition for allowance. Favorable reconsideration of the application as amended is respectfully requested.

The Examiner is invited to contact the undersigned by telephone if it is felt that a telephone interview would advance the prosecution of the present application.

The Commissioner is hereby authorized to charge any additional fees which may be required regarding this application under 37 CFR 1.16-1.17, or credit any overpayment, to Deposit Account No. 19-0741. Should no proper payment be enclosed herewith, as by a check being in the wrong amount, unsigned, post-dated, otherwise improper or informal or even entirely missing, the Commissioner is authorized to charge the unpaid amount to Deposit Account No. 19-0741. If any extensions of time are needed for timely acceptance of papers submitted herewith, Applicants hereby petition for such extension under 37 CFR 1.136 and authorizes payment of any such extensions fees to Deposit Account No. 19-0741.

Respectfully submitted,

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By Mary Michelle Kile

FOLEY & LARDNER LLP  
Customer Number: 22428  
Telephone: (202) 672-5428  
Facsimile: (202) 672-5399

Mary Michelle Kile  
Attorney for Applicants  
Registration No. 35,217